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A call of alert.
In the last few months, the
perception of the end of the Castro regime as a possible reality has
rekindled the hope of many Cubans. This is an event of great importance
because one of the objectives of the dictatorship has always been to
keep its people immersed in defeatism. A positive vision of the future
such as an attainable ideal is almost an indispensable requirement to
materialize a change in Cuba.
This optimism is the beginning of change in the distribution of forces
which the regime itself has taken note. The official political meeting
in answer to the protests of this past July 13th and the speech of this
past July 26th has demonstrated their nervousness. The Cuban democratic
opposition must take advantage of these circumstances to prepare as
rapidly as possible, the conditions that will allow the development of a
responsible strategy. Nevertheless, we think that at this moment, two
serious errors of appreciation are popular.
First: To affirm that in Cuba the conditions are present
for its people to rebel is an error. Between the generalized existence
of displeasure in the population and its disposition to take to the
streets there is a great distance. It is true that in Cuba there exists
a deep level of frustration and that people criticize openly, as never
before. But it is equally certain that instead of a fighting spirit, in
the population prevails a generalized and intense desire to flee the
country.
Second: Even more it is dangerous to think or to affirm
that the dissidence in Cuba is organized at a national level. The
dissidence has, neither sufficient level of organization, nor
coordination in the country. Most of the opposition is disarticulated in
small groups that live under the permanent hostility of the regime.
These do not have recognition nor international endorsement. Many do not
have resources even to mobilize themselves. Once the State Security
discovers them they lose their jobs and are abandoned completely. Even
more, there are false opponents who dedicate themselves to seed the
division in the ranks of the dissidence and in some cases they cause the
ostracism and the persecution of legitimate dissidents.
Truthfully the assistance that reaches a sector of the dissidence is
fundamental, as is the aid received by the families of imprisoned
dissidents. But these efforts must be increased and consolidated. The
Cubans on the outside, which are the true rear of this fight, must
organize more effectively.
Lamentably we are observing as in a capable advertising and repressive
maneuver where the regime demonstrates to the people, to the exile, and
to the world that they control the streets. Dissident leaders are
cornered and harassed in their own homes and the streets by crowds of
the dictatorship in order to demonstrate that the dissidence has neither
organization nor resources to mobilize the population.
The dictatorship needed a victory desperately, a reaffirmation that its
capacity to control is intact. It has obtained it momentarily but we do
not have to be discouraged by this maneuver. The distribution of forces
continues to move against them. We must denounce the harassment that the
dissident leaders undergo and we must avoid, due to improvisation and
overconfidence, that the Cuban people suffer other tactical failures
that slow down and make more expensive the final outcome in favor of
freedom.
César L. Alarcón.
Huber Matos Araluce.
Baltimore, Maryland.
San José, Costa Rica.
Monday, August 15, 2005.
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